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For Heaven's Sake, Give the Child a
Voice: An ADR Approach to
Interfaith Child Custody Disputes
Charlee Lane*
I. INTRODUCTION
The right to maintain complete control over the rearing of children is
traditionally held to be a fundamental right of parenting.' However,
enforcement of this parental right often fails to accommodate the rights of
children.2 Courts have attempted to protect the rights of children by setting
standards by which the choices of parents are limited in regard to child-
rearing practices.' One particularly troubling context in which this conflict
of rights manifests itself is when courts have been importuned to assist
parents in determining child custody arrangements upon the dissolution of
their marriage. While factors have been somewhat consistently laid out to
determine this issue in accordance with the "best interests" of the child,4
some relevant factors lie outside of the authority of the courts. Religion is
. B.A. in Sociology, Rollins College, 2006; J.D. candidate at Pepperdine University School of Law,
2010. Special thanks to my family for their continued and unwavering support. Additional thanks to
Professor Larry Van Sickle for fostering my academic growth, Professor Anthony Miller for his
insight and encouragement throughout the process of writing this article, and the entire journal staff
for their hard work and dedication in preparing this and other articles for publication.
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See also George L. Blum,
Annotation, Religion as a Factor in Child Custody Cases, 124 A.L.R. 203, §2[b] (2004).
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
3. See George L. Blum, Annotation, Religion as a Factor in Visitation Cases, 95 A.L.R. 5th
533 (2002).
4. Id. Under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, courts must determine child custody in
accordance with the "best interest" of the child by considering relevant factors. Those factors
include, but are not limited to: the wishes of the child's parents; the wishes of the child; the
interaction and interrelationship of the child with parents, siblings, and other persons who may
significantly affect the child's best interests; the child's adjustments to his home, school, and
community; and the mental and physical health of all individuals involved. Id.
623
1
Lane: For Heaven's Sake, Give the Child a Voice: An ADR Approach to Int
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2010
one such factor5 in that it directly affects the well being of the child, while at
the same time, consideration of religion as a factor in child custody disputes
is in many cases unconstitutional.6 However, it would be disadvantageous to
all parties involved to ignore religion as a factor entirely based on these
grounds.7 There has been ample study devoted to the problems that arise
when courts are faced with custody disputes intertwined with issues of
religion. Unfortunately, many of those studies conclude without proposing
an effective solution or by suggesting an alternative without defining what
that alternative might be.8
A solution must be employed that allows religious consideration in a
forum more suitable to facilitating a resolution in the complete best interest
of the child and parents. Mediation provides this forum by facilitating a
negotiation in which parents are allowed to develop their own collaborative
solutions to interfaith child custody disputes. Through techniques unique to
the practice of mediation, parents are more capable of resolving religious
conflicts affecting child custody, and thereby enabling the parties to create a
parenting plan and binding mediation agreement that would not only resolve
immediate divorce contestations, but also provide a basis from which to
resolve future issues. The flexibility of mediation also allows for
5. Some states have codified the best interest standard to include the child's spiritual well
being. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 25.24.150(c)(1) (1983). However, despite the inclusion of religion as
a factor, courts remain limited in their consideration of religion due to constitutional parameters. See
U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution guarantee parental liberty, while the First
Amendment guarantees freedom of religion. Id. Under the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, courts are forbidden to indicate preference for or support of one religion over another.
U.S. CONST. amend. I. Therefore, "American courts have insisted that harm to the children be
shown before denying custody on the basis of religion, although they have disagreed over the
certainty and amount of harm necessary." Shauna Van Praagh, Religion, Custody, and a Child's
Identities, 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 309, 330 (1997). For further discussion of harm required, see
infra Part III.
7. See Morris v. Morris, 412 A.2d 139, 142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979). "It would be an egregious
error for our courts in a custody dispute to scrutinize the ability of the parents to foster the child's
emotional development, their capacity to provide adequate shelter and sustenance, and their relative
income, yet not review their respective religious beliefs." Id.
8. See, e.g., C.E. Schneider, Religion and Child Custody, 25 U. MICH. J. LAW. REF. 879, 896-
97 (1992) ("Courts must somehow resolve custody disputes between divorcing parents, even when
those disputes involve a parent's religious beliefs .... What we must work toward here, as
elsewhere in the law of child custody, are courts that try as diligently and earnestly as possible to
encourage parents to agree on their own to custody arrangements they would find satisfactory and
that try, when all else fails, to decipher the child's best interests as thoughtfully and decently as
possible.") (emphasis added). While Schneider seems to be suggesting the right approach, he does
not offer ways in which we might encourage parents to do so.
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considerable advocacy of the child's rights without the burden of legislature
that requires the balancing of parental-rights against state responsibilities.
Part II of this article purports to identify the need for an alternative to
litigation in these cases by defining the social context in which these cases
have become more prevalent, the constitutional barriers faced by courts, and
the inadequate protection afforded to children's rights in traditional
litigation. In response to that need, Part III proposes a specific mediation
model, drawing guidance from the courts, that involves: an evaluative stage
in which the parents and child are afforded an opportunity to express their
interests, a facilitative stage in which the mediator and other participants
assist the parties in resolving the dispute with an aim towards consistency,
and the formulation of an agreement that serves the best interests of the child
and is perceived as fair by the parents. The mediation model utilizes a
structured and process-oriented approach, which incorporates the
participation of advocates for both the child and the religious preferences of
the parents. Part IV concludes this article by emphasizing that the use of the
proposed mediation techniques provides a solution to the problems faced by
courts, divorcing couples, and children in the context of determining the
religious upbringing of children in custody conflicts.
II. THE NEED FOR AN ALTERNATIVE
In a society where divorce is prevalent,9 there has been a general rise in
child custody conflicts over the past several decades, due in part to courts
abandoning historical, gender-biased custody presumptions in favor of a
gender-neutral, judicially determined "best interests" of the child analysis.' °
9. See Patricia M. Hoff, The Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, JUv.
JUST. BULL., Dec. 2001, at 1, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/189181.pdf.
"America is a society with a substantial divorce rate. Each year, more than 1,000,000 children in the
United States are affected by the divorce of their parents, and of all children who are born to married
parents this year, half are likely to experience a divorce in their families before they reach their 18th
birthdays." Id.
10. The majority opinion in Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1135 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990),
summarizes the legislative history:
Historically, courts have resolved such conflicting claims to post-divorce parental
authority with rules and rigid presumptions rather than searching or individualized
analysis. Until the early nineteenth century the ancient doctrine ofpatria potestas gave
fathers virtually unlimited right to custody and control of all legitimate off-spring until
they reached the legal age of majority. In the early nineteenth century, courts began to
reject patria potestas in favor of a pariens patria power of the government to award
custody in accordance with the judicially determined "best interests" of the children. In
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Additionally, custody conflicts focusing on religious issues have increased
due to shifting social patterns and norms." While custody disputes have
traditionally been resolved through litigation, these disputes involving
religious differences present unique challenges in formal litigation, most
notably constitutional limitations and the inadequate protection of children's
rights resulting from those limitations.
A. A Real World Example: The Reyes Case
A bitter dispute that has recently received considerable media attention
accurately represents the problems faced by parents of different faiths
embarking upon divorce and child custody proceedings in the traditional
litigation system. A judge in Cook County, Illinois, recently issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO) against a father, Joseph Reyes,
forbidding him from exposing his three year-old daughter, Ela, to any
religion other than Judaism during his designated visitation.12 The TRO was
requested and ordered after Joseph e-mailed photos of Ela being baptized in
the Catholic Church to Ela's mother in November 2009." Ela's mother,
Rebecca Shapiro, is Jewish, and although Joseph converted to Judaism
following his marriage to Rebecca, he currently identifies himself as
Catholic. 4 Rebecca maintains that the couple agreed to raise Ela in the
Jewish faith during their marriage, while Joseph contends that there was no
practice, however, rejection of the paternal preference embodied in thepatria
potestas doctrine merely paved the way for a maternal preference via the tender years
presumption which dominated the "best interests" analysis.
Id. The "tender years" doctrine encompasses the "presumption that when the children were of
'tender years,' the mother, unless shown to be unfit, should be given preference over the father in the
award of custody." Allan Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, 15 J.
FAM. L. 423, 425 (1976).
11. Neela Banejee, Religion Joins Custody Cases, to Judges' Unease, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/20O8/02/13/us/13custody.html. In addition to the
general increase in parental conflict over custody, the increased incidence of interfaith marriage and
willingness by Americans to convert play an important role in the upsurge of custody cases focused
on religion. Id.
12. Cynthia Dizikes & Kristen Mack, Divorcing Couple War Over Child's Religion, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 16, 2010, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/ct-met-interfaith-
divorce-20100216,0,2673258.story.
13. Id.
14. Id. Joseph converted to Judaism after marrying Rebecca in October 2004. Id. He claims
that the decision to convert was not voluntary; rather, it was the result of immense pressure from
Rebecca's parents that was putting a heavy strain on their marriage. Cleo Andreadis, Joseph Reyes
on Being Barred from Taking Child to Church, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/father-
face-months-jail-taking-daughter-church/story?id=9845952 (last visited Feb. 24, 2010) (providing a
transcript of Reyes's Feb. 16th 2010 interview with ABC correspondent, Chris Cuomo).
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such agreement, 5 and rather that Ela was exposed to both Jewish and
Catholic traditions since birth.' 6 Joseph claims that the judge who issued the
TRO failed to follow the "best interest of the child" standard and instead
"engaged in name-calling, gave his decision, based it on the distinction that
he made in his mind's eye between Judaism and Catholicism, and that was
the end of it.' 7 In response to the TRO, Joseph invited a news crew to
follow him and Ela as they attended mass at Holy Name Cathedral. 8 Joseph
is currently being held in contempt for violating the order, a charge that
carries a maximum jail sentence of six months. 19 Joseph stated, "The fact
that this order was even issued speaks to the fact that judges are willing to
encroach on fundamental rights simply to appease an unreasonable party in
divorce hearings. 2 ° Just weeks after the TRO was issued, the court entered
a Judgment for Dissolution of Marriage granting Joseph the freedom to take
Ela to church during his visitation time;2' a decision entirely inconsistent
with the TRO he is accused of violating. The inconsistent rulings in this
case present an ideal opportunity to demonstrate how a specific mediation
model can serve to minimize the negative consequences of resolving these
disputes in traditional litigation.
B. A Constitutional Problem
Under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, parents are
guaranteed a constitutional right to freedom of religion,22 which translates to
a right to determine the religious upbringing of their children as well.
15. Dizikes & Mack, supra note 12.
16. See Andreadis, supra note 14. In his interview with Chris Cuomo from ABC News,
Joseph stated:
There was no religious decision made in terms of Ela will be raised in this religion.
Basically my wife and I had both practiced openly. For example, we would celebrate
Christmas together, we would celebrate Easter together, we would also celebrate Rosh
Hashanah together, we would celebrate Hanukkah together. So, it wasn't a matter of, you
know, one or the other, it was a matter of celebrating both.
Id.
17. Id.
18. See id.; Dizikes & Mack, supra note 12.
19. Dizikes & Mack, supra note 12.
20. Andreadis, supra note 14.
21. In re Marriage of Reyes, No. 08 D 4072 / 08 D 4080 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2010) (Judgment for
Dissolution of Marriage).
22. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
627
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Consequently, a court is limited in its authority to decide custody issues
based on religious criteria.23 Courts have wide discretion to limit parental
freedom when the child's welfare is at stake, however, they must avoid
making this determination directly on religious grounds.24 Where a careful
balance must be struck between the best interest of the child and the
constitutionally protected religious freedom of the parties involved, courts
are forced to expend valuable time and resources focusing on achieving this
balance rather than directly resolving the issue at hand.
Religion arises in several contexts within child custody disputes, the
most difficult being that in which both parents intend to give the child
religious training, but each parent subscribes to a different religion.26 This is
precisely the context of the aforementioned Reyes case. In these disputes,
courts are faced with the issue of weighing one religion against the other: a
23. See Blum, supra note 3, at §2[b] ("It is typically held that any state action regarding
religion ... must satisfy three criteria to be permissible under the Federal Constitution: (1) it must
have a secular purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion;
and, (3) it must not foster excessive government entanglement with religion.").
24. See Morris v. Morris, 412 A.2d 139, 143 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) ("In matters of custody
[... ] the courts of this Commonwealth, in accord with those in other jurisdictions, have
consistently held that while religious beliefs must not constitute the sole determinant in a child
custody award, the court may consider those beliefs in rendering a decree."); Munoz v. Munoz, 489
P.2d 1133, 1135 (Wash. 1971) ("Thus, the rule appears to be well established that the courts should
maintain an attitude of strict impartiality between religions and should not disqualify any applicant
for custody or restrain any person having custody or visitation rights from taking the children to a
particular church, except where there is a clear and affirmative showing that the conflicting religious
beliefs affect the general welfare of the child."); see also Ex parte Hilley, 405 So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1981)
(requiring a mother to curtail all religious activities that caused her to be away from the children was
an abuse of discretion and effectively restricted her free exercise of religion; only if the court found
that her involvement in the church would be detrimental to the children's well being, could the issue
of religion be considered); Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233 (Ala. 1979) (directing the trial judge
to consider the religious and social needs of the child is constitutional only in so much as there is an
actual showing of those needs); Osier v. Osier, 410 A.2d 1027 (Me. 1980) (holding that a
determination of custody involving inquiry into the religious practices of the parents is only
appropriate where the court had made a threshold determination that the religious practice in
question directly endangers the child's well-being and the parents conflicting interests are
sufficiently balanced to minimize infringement on the parent's rights).
25. See infra note 33 and accompanying text. See also Praagh, supra note 6, at 334 ("The
often uncompromising nature of religious beliefs means that no court-directed scheme of custody
and access will fully meet the constitutional demands made by both parents."). Litigation already
poses huge financial and emotional burdens on the parties involved, therefore pursuing litigation in a
context unfit for court intervention simply exacerbates these burdens.
26. Religion may enter the equation in many different contexts, but it is in this specific context
that this article focuses. For additional situations where religion may become the core of the custody
dispute, see Praagh, supra note 6, at 338 (explaining two situations where divorce in a diverse
society includes parents of different religions where a religious community dictates a strict way of
life or denial of custody to one parent might be "a severe blow to the particular community which, in
turn, may articulate a claim based on equal standing and multiculturalism").
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determination forbidden by the Establishment Clause.27 Consequently,
judges are unwilling or unable to take on custody disputes deeply rooted in
28a 11religion, posing a problem for the parties endeavoring to resolve these
disputes.2 9 When judges have been willing to adjudicate, the outcome has
been inconsistent, 30 leaving parents and children at the mercy of the court
and interfering substantially with parental freedom.31
C. Protecting Children's Rights
The inconsistent outcomes of custody disputes involving parents of
different religions also puts children's well-being at risk by failing to
provide individually tailored standards for determining a child's best interest
in a context where these interests are highly complex and varied.32
Additionally, the right of the child to practice the religion of their choice--or
27. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
28. See Banerjee, supra note 11. When judges do rule on these cases, they are faced with the
serious concern that their judgment will be seen as an attack on the religious community or
communities to which the parents belong. See id. Since mediation is a private process specifically
tailored to the parents' individual case, and has no binding effect on future disputes, this risk is
eliminated. See id.
29. Additionally, the question often arises whether to enforce pre-divorce religious training
agreements. This determination is beyond the scope of this paper, but for further discussion, see
Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1143-1149 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
30. Id. at 1149. Since states are free to determine their own criteria for resolving the issue, the
case law is varied and the determinations, strictly circumstantial. Id. See also discussion supra Part
II.A.
31. In the Reyes case, the judge chose to address the interfaith issue; a choice that Joseph
found appalling. Andreadis, supra note 14. In his "20/20" interview, he states, "My jaw, it just hit
the ground because [the judge] basically went through his reasoning which was all based on
doctrinal separation; an area that typically, the judicial system abstains from getting into." Id.
Joseph additionally states, "There are dads all over this country whose rights to be a parent are being
infringed upon, there are dads who aren't seeing their child because someone, the estranged wife,
decided to go into court and make a bunch of false accusations." Id. This statement is indicative of
the negative response parents often have in these cases; one which can be mitigated tremendously by
the mediation process.
32. See Praagh, supra note 6, at 335. "[It] is evident.., that 'best interests' and 'harm' are
both terms with open-ended definitions and, further, that they operate as sides of the same coin, both
used to justify a judge's decision as to the scope of custody and access." See id. Joseph Reyes
provides a real example of a parent who is aware of the shortcomings of the "best interest" standard.
He states, "There's this standard which is completely undefined. The best interest of the child
standard is really just a cloak for the courts to do whatever it chooses to do. That's horrible."
Andreadis, supra note 14.
629
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none at all-finds no place in a court adjudicated custody case3 3 where only
the temporal well-being of the child may be considered. Primary focus by
courts on the constitutional concerns surrounding parents' rights3 4 often
means that the equal fight of children to freedom of religion fall by the
wayside. 35  As the outcome of a custody dispute dictates the religious
circumstances of the children more so than the parents, the main focus
should not be whether the parents' rights are jeopardized, but rather whether
33. See James G. Dwyer, Parent's Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine
of Parent's Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1381 (1994). Dwyer comments on two cases in which the
Supreme Court dealt with the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with parenting (Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) and Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hospital, 390 U.S.
598 (1968)). Dwyer states:
These cases thus endorse an interpretation of certain constitutional provisions as
conferring on some persons rights to control not only their own behaviors and life
choices, but also those of certain other persons-namely, their children. Both cases
appear to prescribe a balancing test, weighing the parents' interest in fulfilling their
religious aspirations through their children against the State's interest in protecting the
welfare of children and in promoting other societal values. Neither decision considered
whether children have a right to protection from such manipulation by others.
Dwyer, supra, at 1382. He goes on to point out that in another Supreme Court case dealing with the
Free Exercise Clause and parenting (Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)), the majority states,
"parents' free exercise right to control their children's lives also trumps any conflicting preferences
or interests of the children, except where a state demonstrates that the children are at risk of serious
harm .... The court thus suggested that parental free exercise rights can operate to limit the
religious liberty of children." Dwyer, supra, at 1387-88.
34. See id. at 1424-26. The main rationale for the court's persistence in protecting parental
control rights under the constitution is a matter of tradition rather than legitimacy:
That some practice or rule has a long tradition does not, however, mean that it is in
anyone's interests; a tradition might persist even though on the whole it diminishes the
well being of all concerned parties, including those who appear to be its beneficiaries....
However, when good reason exists for challenging such a traditional practice or rule,
courts should ask whether it does in fact serve the interests supposed to underlie it, and
whether it is indeed just and consistent with other legal principles. If a traditional rule or
practice fails this test, then it no longer merits constitutional protection.
See id. Although today, children are considered to hold constitutional rights of their own, the
continued practice of enforcing the parent's Free Exercise rights sometimes at the expense of the
child's rights indicates that the legal system still falls short of providing parents and children equal
protection under the law. See id.
35. See Schneider, supra note 8, at 899. "[W]e accord parents rights because we assume they
are the best decision-makers for their own children. But people in and after a divorce are often
wrapped up in a battle with each other, and they may only too easily lose sight of their children's
interests." See id See also Praagh, supra note 6, at 350 n. 114. "[T]he ability to choose to be
religious or not, or to adhere to a specific religion, is incorporated into the meaning of freedom of
religion for adults." Id. "[Wihile a right to religious freedom, traditionally understood, does not
appear to capture the perspective of children of interfaith parents engaged in a dispute over custody
and religion, consideration of that perspective might contribute to a more child-responsive
understanding of such a right." Id. at 351.
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the children's rights are adequately protected in developing a custody
arrangement that effectively serves their individual needs and interests.36
The aforementioned barriers faced by courts, coupled with the
inadequate protection of children's rights, suggest the need for an alternative
forum better suited to resolving custody issues rooted in religion. Mediation
provides such a forum where parents are afforded an opportunity to maintain
control over the determination of child custody issues in accordance with the
objective and actual best interests of the child.
D. Avoiding Future Litigation to Modify Custody Arrangements
Although it may be temporarily beneficial to have a judge render a final
decision in an especially complex custody dispute, the likely dissatisfaction
of one or both parties increases the likelihood of the parties straying from the
court order or returning to court to modify the arrangement.37 Once the
court has mandated a separation agreement, incorporated in the divorce
decree, it can only be altered in the future if the court either finds that there
was a clearly erroneous determination of the child's best interests or where
the challenging party demonstrates a change in circumstances that no longer
renders the arrangement in the best interest of the child.38 In both situations,
the parties are forced to return to litigation and effectively repeat the custody
battle, requiring additional time, money, and stress. Through the flexibility
of mediation procedures, a plan for the resolution of future disputes can be
incorporated into the mediation agreement, reducing the need for future
litigation.
36. See generally Praagh, supra note 6, at 349. In reference to court adjudicated custody
cases: "Custody and access arrangements concerning religion should be scrutinized for any
infringement of the religious freedom of the children involved." Id. While the child's rights may
take a back seat to the constitutional rights of the parents in a litigation setting, mediation provides a
setting in which these interests can be afforded adequate protection prior to an arrangement being
reached, therefore limiting the need for post-agreement scrutiny.
37. See Schneider, supra note 8, at 903. "People have particularly strong motives for
following their own preferences in religion, and it is particularly problematic for government to
monitor what happens in the privacy of families. Courts will thus often fail to persuade parents who
disagree over religion to do what the judge asks." Id.
38. Blum, supra note 1.
9
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E. Additional Advantages to Mediation
There are further benefits to mediating religion-based custody disputes
in regard to the mental and emotional well-being of all parties involved.
First, courts recognize that "emotional distress to a child 'arising from a
parental dispute regarding a child's religious upbringing may depend more
on the manner in which the dispute is conducted, than the theological aspects
of the dispute itself."' 39 Second, the psychologically damaging effects of
divorce for parents may also be mitigated in the mediation process by
focusing on reaching an agreement that is perceived as fair rather than a
simple application of the law as attempted by courts. 40 Finally, mediation
poses less of a financial burden on parties, 41 which may serve to reduce the
overall stress of the dissolution and facilitate a more effective resolution.
If one considers these benefits in the context of the Reyes case, it is clear
that dragging a three-year-old child through the media circus that has ensued
as a result of litigating this dispute could have long term psychological
consequences for Ela. Additionally, the fact that Joseph does not view the
arrangement as fair, as evidenced by his violation of the TRO, has
psychologically damaging effects on both parents. These effects have
manifested themselves in a protracted and unnecessary custody battle that
has lasted well over a year.42 The result is a waste of time and resources for
both the parents and the courts.
F. Mandatory Mediation
Although not directly related to cases involving religion, many states
have recognized the general challenges encountered by family law courts
and have enacted mandatory mediation requirements authorized by statute
39. In re Marriage of Weiss, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 345 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Zummo
v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1156 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)).
40. See Nina Meierding, The Impact of Cultural and Religious Diversity in the Divorce
Mediation Process, MEDIATION Q., 1992, at 297-305.
Despite the fact that divorce is one of the most traumatic occurrences in life, cultural and
religious responses to divorce are irrelevant in the formal court process. Many divorcing
couples, adrift in a sea of conflicting emotions, feel that the court is not interested in what
is fair, only what is the law .... A cultural and religious frame of reference directly
affects each party's perspective on fairness, recognition of the importance of the conflict,
and willingness to mediate and resolve the conflict.
Id. at 297.
41. CINNIE NOBLE, L. LESLIE DIZGUN & D. PAUL EDMOND, MEDIATION ADVOCACY:
EFFECTIVE CLIENT REPRESENTATION IN MEDIATION PROCEEDINGS 21-22 (1998).
42. The Reyes' divorce proceedings began in 2008. Dizikes & Mack, supra note 12.
10
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for contested divorces.43 While statutes mandating mediation may serve to
minimize time and resources expended by inappropriate litigation, in
contested divorce cases, the initial mandated mediation often serves to
evaluate the conflict between parties rather than effectively facilitating a
resolution. In addition, divorcing couples that are mandated to participate in
mediation might be less likely to cooperate in reaching an agreement without
court intervention. Mediators must be willing to encourage the parties to
participate in further, voluntary mediation sessions, where the parties would
likely find themselves in a more suitable forum to resolve difficult conflicts,
such as determining the religious upbringing of their children.
III. THE MEDIATION APPROACH
Before delineating a specific approach to mediation in these cases, 44 it is
beneficial to look at the way in which courts have traditionally dealt with
child custody disputes and then incorporate the religious interests of the
parties involved. The mediation should still include consideration of all
other relevant factors in addition to those involving religion.45 Looking to
the courts, judges may consider religious criteria in determinin custody
only when religion bears directly on the child's general welfare. 4 Among
states, there are three prevalent legal standards for doing so: actual or
substantial harm;47 risk of harm;48 and no harm required. 49  When there is
43. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.060 (2009) (authorizing parties to request mediation, and
authorizing courts to mandate mediation, if not requested, at any time if it determines that mediation
may result in a more satisfactory settlement between parties); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3170 (West 2009)
(authorizing courts to mandate mediation of contested issues in child custody and visitation
proceedings); IOWA CODE § 598.41 (authorizing courts to mandate mediation prior to ruling upon
joint custody proceedings, absent history of domestic abuse or resulting physical or emotional harm
to the parties involved); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.755 (2009) (authorizing courts to mandate mediation
and provide a mediation orientation session for all parties in which child custody, parenting time, or
visitation is in dispute).
44. This article focuses primarily on using mediation to reach an agreement as to the religious
upbringing of children subsequent to divorce; however the proposed techniques might also be
applicable to additional elements of the child custody agreement.
45. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 3. See also supra text accompanying note 23.
46. See cases cited supra note 24; Dwyer, supra note 33, at 1428.
47. See Pater v. Pater, 588 N.E. 2d 794, 799-801 (Ohio 1992) (holding that religious customs
that restrict a child's social activities are insufficient to justify court intervention absent a showing
that these customs harm the mental or physical health of the child).
48. See MacLagan v. Klein, 473 S.E.2d 778, 786-87 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that
religious considerations were appropriate where exposing a Jewish child to Methodist services might
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clear evidence of actual harm to the child or a clear risk of harm, it may be
more appropriate to pursue litigation in order to reach a custody arrangement
that is in the best interest of the child. However, when this risk is unclear
and the decision is a matter of weighing the relative merits of one religion
over another, mediation is a more appropriate place to start in resolving the
dispute. Absent clear standards for determining the best interests of the
child, the mediator must take responsibility for ensuring that the child's
interests are adequately represented in the mediation process and in the
agreed upon custody arrangement.5 °
Arguably the most extensive commentary on a court's consideration of
religion as a factor in a child custody case occurred in a Pennsylvania
Superior Court case, Zummo v. Zummo. In Zummo, the mother, an actively
practicing Jew, and father, a sporadically practicing Roman Catholic,
importuned the court of common pleas to resolve a dispute regarding the
religious upbringing of their children subsequent to their divorce.5 2 The trial
court, applying the "best interests" of the child standard, restricted the
father's right to expose the children to his religious practices, based on six
religious factors.53 On appeal, the superior court vacated the trial court's
restriction of the father's religious rights and thoroughly discussed the trial
court's improper application of the religious factors.54 The superior court's
analysis and discussion of the trial court's decision provides an excellent
interfere with the child's Jewish identity and adversely affect her emotional welfare in the future),
overruled on other grounds by Pulliam v. Smith, 501 S.E.2d 898, 900 (N.C. 1998).
49. See Johns v. Johns, 918 S.W. 2d 728, 733 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996) (deferring to the wishes of
the custodial parent without consideration of harm to the child).
50. See DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 79-80 (Phyllis Bernard &
Bryant Garth eds., 2002). See generally Meierding, supra note 40, at 2 ("The mediator should not be
an advocate for either party but, at the same time, should not allow the mediation process to assist a
coercive party to achieve his or her ends."). This proposition should extend to the children involved
in the mediation as well. While the mediator should not advocate on behalf of the child directly,
they are still responsible for ensuring that the child's rights and interests are not compromised by the
rights and interests of his or her parents.
51. 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)
52. Id. at 1141.
53. Id at 1142. The superior court stated:
The trial court noted several factors in support of the challenged restrictions: the
Zummo's had orally agreed prior to their marriage that any children to their marriage
would be raised as Jews; during the marriage the children were raised as Jews; it was in
the children's best interests to preserve the stability of their religious beliefs; the father's
practice of Catholicism was only sporadic while the mother's practice of Judaism had
been active; Judaism and Catholicism are irreconcilable; and, exposure to both religions
might "unfairly confuse and disorient the children, and perhaps vitiate all benefits
flowing from either religion."
Id.
54. See id. at 1142-58.
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model for formulating a mediation approach that allows these factors to be
applied properly in an appropriate forum.
A. Choosing a Mediator
The ability to choose a particular mediator varies greatly depending on
the circumstances of the case. Unfortunately, this choice may be paramount
in determining the ultimate success of the mediation. Facilities exist
specifically for the mediation of interfaith disputes, whether or not it is in the
context of a divorce.55 However, some parents, upon seeking the dissolution
of their marriage, may not have access to these specific facilities, may not
realize that religion is going to play a key role in their custody arrangement,
or both. 6 As a result, it is the responsibility of the mediator to be educated
about the special needs of these parties and be informed about their
options. 7 It may not be necessary to refer the parties to an interfaith
mediator, but rather, a more practical solution would be to keep spiritual
leaders and advisors as references that can participate in the mediation
process as advocates for each side. It is often the case that clergy from
different religions will volunteer to provide assistance during the mediation
process.58
Under this model, parents should be encouraged to either invite their
own clergy to participate or select a volunteer from a list provided by the
mediator.59 The clergy members, with proper training, will act as either co-
mediators, advocates, or both for each parent. While it may be beneficial for
55. For an example of a mediation facility specifically designed for interfaith disputes, see
Pulling Together Mediation Center, http://pullingtogethermediation.com (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
56. Particularly those parties who find themselves in court mandated mediation.
57. Regardless of whether the mediator is chosen by the parties or appointed by the courts, this
article assumes that mediators hold an advanced degree and have availed themselves of the proper
experience and skills necessary to facilitate the mediation of complex and highly sensitive family
law disputes.
58. For those parties who may be unable to afford a mediator trained specifically in interfaith
mcdiations, organizations such as the Center for Church-State Studies at DePaul University in
Chicago offer training session for clergy volunteers in order to provide them with the skills
necessary to participate in interfaith mediations. See The Interfaith Family Mediation Project,
http://www.law.depaul.edu/centersinstitutes/ccss/ifmp.asp (last visited Apr. 9, 2010). Mediators
should seek out similar organizations in their area, and inform the parties of their availability and the
benefits of interfaith mediation.
59. Id. If possible, parents should be encouraged to provide their own clergy member because
they would likely already have a trusting relationship with him or her and would benefit from the
continued involvement of that person post-mediation.
635
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the clergy to maintain a temporary role in the process, ideally they would be
able to stay with the parties throughout the mediation in order to maintain
consistency and improve the overall outcome of the custody arrangement.
B. Evaluative Stage
Facilitating a successful child custody negotiation among parents with
different religious beliefs requires focusing on the interests of both the
parents and the children involved. Since religion is often viewed as a basic
need, it is an interest rather than a legal issue. 60 Therefore, an integrative
bargaining technique that focuses on the individual interests of the parties
rather than their positions is most effective in negotiating an agreement. 1
The mediator should take an active but impartial role in facilitating this
negotiation.62 While it is important for the parties to maintain control over
the negotiation process, it may become necessary for the mediator to suggest
an approach, reiterating the importance of the child's best interests, if the
parties are unable to create their own. At this stage, the participation of
clergy members is valuable for providing parents with answers to their faith
related questions, as well as providing the clergy with the opportunity to
obtain the information necessary to later suggest possible custody
arrangements.63
The most effective approach will be one that clarifies the interests of all
involved parties and works towards best meeting those needs while
maintaining a perception of fairness between both parents.64 The mediator
should initiate an evaluative stage of the mediation 65 in which he or she
starts by asking each parent to clearly explain their religious position and
what interests would be met through the child's exposure to those religious
views. It may be helpful to encourage the parents to focus on the interests of
the child by inquiring into the perceived effects and benefits of their
religious position on the development of the child.66 Once both parents have
had an opportunity to clarify their interests, they should also be given an
60. See generally NINA MEIERD1NG, DIVORCE MEDIATION TRAINING MANUAL § 2-3 (2003).
61. Id.
62. Id. § 3-6.
63. The Interfaith Family Mediation Project, supra note 59.
64. See MEIERDING, supra note 61, § 2-4.
65. There is often an evaluative stage and a facilitative stage of mediation, although both may
occur simultaneously throughout the process. By conducting a mini-evaluation at the outset of the
mediation, the mediator may be better equipped to steer the negotiation appropriately for the
individual circumstances of the dispute. However, this evaluation is separate from the initial
evaluation performed by the child advocate as referred to later in this Part.
66. See Schneider, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
636
14
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol10/iss3/7
[Vol. 10: 3, 2010]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
opportunity to express their concerns regarding the competing interests of
the other party. The mediator's role at this point should be to find any
consistent themes between the interests expressed by each parent,67 and then
determine if these common aims could be reached without restricting the
child's access to the respective religious teachings.
Because the negotiation will ultimately affect the child's religious
exposure and training, the child's personal interests must be paramount in
the process. Without firm rules governing mediation, there is a risk of the
child's rights not being adequately respected.68  Similar to the approach
taken by courts, the focus of the negotiation process should be to find an
arrangement that serves the best interest of the child. 69 Looking to standards
developed by courts to determine what constitutes the child's "best interest"
may be helpful in addition to the child's participation in the mediation
process through an advocate to clarify their specific needs and interests and
67. For example, if one parent expresses that the child should be raised Catholic because the
Church teaches important values and principles, and the other parent expresses that the child should
be raised Jewish because the Jewish community provides access to role models who may play a
important role in the child's life, the mediator might suggest that the overarching theme is an interest
in the child's cultural and moral development which may be achieved through access to both
religions. See infra note 88.
68. See Schneider, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
69. While it is the responsibility of the mediator to maintain the focus of the mediation on the
best interests of the child, there is considerable flexibility in a mediation that cannot be achieved
through litigation. In order to maintain a reasonably consistent "best interest" standard, courts
sometimes intervene when intervention is either unnecessary or ineffective. See Schneider, supra
note 8, at 901. Since "courts are poorly situated to gather, analyze, and evaluate evidence" relating
to religious conflict, the focus turns instead to a standardized approach to determining the child's
best interest in an attempt to prevent all harms to children. Id. However,
Parents always do things that make children unhappy, and judging by the prevalence of
neurosis, always do things that have lasting harmful effects on children. It can be difficult
for a court to tell when things have gone beyond that irreducible baseline and to decide
what should be done when they have.
Id. at 903. The majority in Zummo comments:
For children of divorce in general, and children of intermarriage as divorce especially,
expose to parents' conflicting values, lifestyles, and religious beliefs may indeed cause
doubts and stress. However, stress is not always harmful, not is it always to be avoided
and protected against. The key is not whether the child experiences stress, but whether
the stress experienced is unproductively severe.
Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1155 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). Mediation diminishes the risk of
unnecessary court intervention because a decision reached by both parties, focused on the child's
rights, and cautiously steered by the mediator, stands a much better chance of utilizing a customized
standard for determining the child's best interest. Additionally, the child advocate should be
properly trained in psychology and child development, rendering them capable of determining when
the child's stress is "unproductively severe."
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their perception of the proposed religious training arrangement to fulfill
those needs.7 °
Without unduly limiting the parents' control of the process, the mediator
should play an active role in facilitating an opportunity for the child to
express his or her religious interests. 71 Just as some courts will consider the
preferences of the child in custody arrangements, the child's preferences
must be considered in mediation.72 The interests of the child can often be
divided into two interdependent categories: integrity interests 73 and identity
interests.74 While very young children may be unable to effectively state
their interests, 75 older children should be given an opportunity to participate
70. See discussion infra notes 75 and 76.
71. For a more extensive discussion on the benefits of children's participation in divorce
mediation, see Jennifer E. McIntosh et al., Child-Focused and Child-Inclusive Divorce Mediation:
Comparative Outcomes from a Prospective Study of Postseparation Adjustment, 46 FAM. CT. REV.
105 (2008) (In a study conducted comparing child-focused intervention in mediation with child-
inclusive intervention, "[a]greements reached by the [Child-Inclusive] group were significantly more
durable, and the parents in this group were half as likely to instigate new litigation over parenting
matters in the year after mediation as were the [Child-Focused] parents.").
72. California Family Code Section 3042 states "if a child is of sufficient age and capacity to
reason so as to form and intelligent preference as to custody, the court shall consider and give due
weight to the wishes of the child in making an order granting or modifying custody." CAL. FAM.
CODE § 3042(a) (West 2004).
73. "The integrity interest of children refer to the protection of their bodies, minds, and spirits
from harm or damage. Such damage is understood to have a negative impact on children's
development and dignity, and is thus contrary to their interests, needs, and perhaps rights." Praagh,
supra note 6, at 359.
74. "The notion of identity interests generally refers to a child's belonging to a community or
communities. The significance of identity interests is premised on the idea that children develop a
sense of identity as they grow and that connection with individuals and groups informs that identity."
Id. at 357.
75. The maturity of a minor does not always directly correlate to age, therefore there is no
bright line rule for when a minor is mature enough to maintain or express religious interests. Some
courts have attempted to make this determination, but concede that it is largely circumstantial. See,
e.g., Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1240 (Ala. 1979) stating,
The maturity of a minor will, of course, vary from case to case and will not always
correspond to the minor's chronological age. In our discussion, we have spoken of a
fifteen-year-old minor. We believe that, under ordinary circumstances, an average fifteen
year old will be of sufficient intellectual and emotional development to warrant a court in
giving serious consideration to the child's expressed needs with respect to religion,
assuming that the child has some actual needs. While we express no opinion as to the
minimum age a child must attain before he or she can properly be classified as having
religious needs, the child must be of sufficient age to have developed some understanding
of religion and its place in his or her life. We note favorably, however, one court's
holding that children aged three, five, and seven are not of sufficient maturity to form an
intelligent opinion on so complex a subject as religion or their needs with respect to it.
Id.
638
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in the mediation to the extent necessary to fully express their interests.76
Because relative authority and bargaining power is unequal here, the
interests of the child should be obtained during a caucus 77 to ensure the
cooperation of the child and the accuracy of the information gained.78 The
best way to do this would be to appoint an advocate for the child that is
trained in child development. 79  This advocate would be responsible for
providing therapeutic counseling to the child,80 and then upon the child's
request,8 would participate in the mediation on the child's behalf. The
appointed child advocate would also conduct a fact-specific evaluation of
the relative risk of harm to the child, at the outset of the mediation, based on
several factors. These factors include, but are not limited to: the age of the
child,82 the strength of the child's current religious identity,83 and the impact
of current parental conflict on the child's integrity.
84
76. The preferences and participation of children should not be rendered useless merely
because they are considered too young to have the capacity to accurately express their interests.
Rather, it simply becomes a factor to consider when weighing their interests against those of the
parent's and those of the child as perceived by the parents.
77. See Meierding, supra note 61, § 6-2 to 6-3.
78. A careful balance must be struck here. While it is important to have the child's interests
advocated in the mediation, asking a child to choose between two religions may be in effect like
asking them to choose between their parents. Rabbi Jeffrey A. Marx, Divorce and Interfaith Family,
http://www.interfaithfamily.com/relationships/marriage-and-relationships/Divorce-and theInterfai
thFamily.shtml (last visited Apr. 9, 2010). This often places them in an unfair position and should
be done with careful consideration. Id.
79. See McIntosh et al., supra note 71, at 107. Participating clergy may also be effective
advocates for the child when the use of a trained professional is impractical.
80. See id. Counseling may be provided prior to the mediation and, if necessary, throughout
the entire process.
81. It is more important that the mediator and child advocate obtain full disclosure of the
child's interests, in order to evaluate the circumstances of the case in the initial phase of the
mediation, than having the interests of the child disclosed to the parents in the mediation. Thus, the
child advocate should inform the child of the confidentiality of their communications and only
disclose that information to which the child gives their consent. Should the child request that no part
of the communications be disclosed in the mediation, the advocate may still use the information to
make a preliminary evaluation of the feasibility of mediation, but need not participate in the
mediation on behalf of the child.
82. See Dwyer, supra note 33, at 1427 ("There is disagreement ... about the age at which
children become competent to make certain decisions for themselves and to engage responsibility in
certain activities."). However, the use of a child development specialist as an advocate for the
child's rights in mediation allows for a case specific application of those rights regardless of the
child's level of competence.
83. "[T]he child's development thrives on connections that enrich her identity and, at the same
time, depends on protection from damage or harm." Praagh, supra note 6, at 360. Therefore, an
17
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Although inappropriate to determine custody, several of the factors
discussed in Zummo provide insight into the minds of the parties and help to
reveal their relative interests in the mediation. Those factors which should
be considered, if applicable, at this stage in the mediation are: (1) whether
the parents had a pre-divorce religious training agreement; (2) the relative
devoutness of the parents; (3) the relevance of the perceived differences in
religions; and (4) the child's pre-divorce religious training.85
First, the existence of a pre-divorce agreement regarding the religious
training of the child indicates that the parents had once agreed upon the most
appropriate approach to their child's upbringing. As a result of the divorce,
a significant change in circumstances was created and requires the initial
agreement to be altered to take into account this change. It may be helpful
to use this agreement as a starting point for the parties to express the
interests involved in reaching the initial agreement and how the change in
circumstances has affected those interests. 8 6
Second, the relative devoutness of each parent should not indicate which
parent is more qualified to determine the religious training of the child,87 but
getting an idea of how active each party is in their respective religions will
help to clarify the strength and scope of their interests in the mediation.
Third, exploring the relevance of perceived differences between
religions provides an opportunity to find consistency within the aims of
evaluation of the child's religious identity is paramount to a determination of the importance of
maintaining the stability of the child's beliefs.
84. See INTERPARENTAL CONFLICT AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND
APPLICATIONS 339 (John Grych & Frank Fincham eds., 2001).
85. See Zummo v. Zumnmo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
86. For example, in the Reyes case, Rebecca asserts that the couple agreed to raise Ela in the
Jewish faith during their marriage. Dizikes & Mack, supra note 12. However, Joseph disagrees
with this contention and a mediated discussion of both parents' understanding of the supposed
agreement would be beneficial to assist the mediator in eliciting all necessary facts and positions.
While a judge would be limited to the sworn testimony of each parent in court, the mediator has a
unique opportunity to facilitate a more thorough discussion of the facts as well as speaking to each
party directly in a caucus providing a more comprehensive picture of the specific circumstances of
the case.
87. See Dwyer, supra note 33, at 1427-1428 (stating
It is not self-evident that a connection exists between parents' religious beliefs and
children's interests... [to establish this connection] [i]t is necessary to show that the
very fact of adhering to a religion-any religion-whose tenets include preferred modes
of parenting makes a parent better able or more disposed to further the temporal interests
of the child.)
Additionally, "[c]hildren absorb beliefs, values, ideas, customs, personality components, a sense of
future, and historical linkages (as in ethnic identification) from both parents. Just because one parent
attends to certain tasks more so than the other does not mean that the latter is less important in the
child's development." Stanley Clawar, One House, Two Cars, Three Kids, 5 FAM. ADvOC. 14, 16
(1982).
640
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each. A common concern contemplated (arguably inappropriately) by courts
faced with the decision of whether to allow the child to be exposed to
different religions is how inconsistency or instability of religious teachings
may affect child development.88 The beneficial impact of consistency and
stability on child development is widely recognized: however, there is no
clear indication that exposure to multiple religions necessarily correlates
with a negative impact on child development.89 Under certain circumstances
it may actually prove beneficial to allow parents' different religions to
coexist in the life of the child.90 By allowing the parties an opportunity to
express the perceived differences in their respective religions and the effect
those differences may have on the child, the mediator is able to gain a better
understanding of the religious conflict and identify additional underlying
interests of the parties.
Finally, consideration of the child's pre-divorce religious training is
essential to a determination of his or her interests. By identifying the child's
religious identity, if any, based upon their past religious exposure and the
child's current religious perceptions, the child's subjective religious needs
and interests can be accounted for in the greater context of the custody
negotiation.
88. "We conclude that while the desire to provide or maintain stability in the already
tumultuous context of a divorce is generally a significant factor in custody determinations, courts
constitutionally cannot have any interest in the stability of a child's religious beliefs." Zummo, 574
A.2d at 1152.
89. Id. at 1157. "The caselaw, commentaries, and empirical studies all suggest.., that while
some [children] may suffer emotional distress from exposure to contradictory religions, most do
not." Id.
90. The court in Zummo uses the example of Christians and Jews to note that while they may
have very different tenets, there are also significant similarities. Thus, "irreconcilability does not
inevitably signify conflict and hostility." Id. at 1154. The opinion also quotes Samuel Sandmel's
book, We Jews and Jesus:
We are not so much opposed as we are different from each other, working in co-
operation. The helmsmen of the craft of faith are of different persuasion, but through
steering carefully across the currents and crosscurrents of troubled times their direction
may well be toward a mainland of understanding, and thereby of blessing to humanity.
SAMUEL SANDMEL, WE JEWS AND JESUS 150-52 (1965). By focusing on the similarities rather than
differences between religions, parents may be able to find common aims that could ultimately lead to
the belief that compromise and coexistence of different faiths does not necessarily mean
inconsistency and conflict, but rather a more extensive foundation on which the child can build his
or her own religious identity. The Reyes case provides a good example of parents exposing their
child to differing religious traditions during their marriage and indicates that the concern is not
necessarily one of inconsistency to the child but rather a power play between the parents as a result
of the divorce conflict. See generally Andreadis, supra note 14 (discussing the circumstances of the
child's religious exposure during and after the parent's marriage).
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Different mediation techniques are appropriate depending on the
specific circumstances of the case. Where the competing interests of the
parents would not directly cause harm to the child, a technique may be
appropriate in which the labels of each religion are removed in order to
allow those religious aims to co-exist. 9' On the other hand, where the
different religions of the parents are in direct conflict and would create an
inconsistent and harmful environment for the child, it may be necessary to
limit the religious freedom of one or both parents, in order to protect the
well-being of the child.92 If it becomes clear that the parents are unable to
reach an agreement that would serve those interests, the mediator has an
ethical duty to end the mediation in favor of court intervention.93 Therefore,
in the evaluative stage of the mediation, the parties and children should be as
open as possible to provide the mediator and other participants with a full
understanding of the facts and interests in the particular case. To ensure full
disclosure of facts and interests, the mediator is responsible for creating an
environment in which the parties feel they can express themselves openly
and safely. 94 With the relevant facts and interests in mind, it is the role of
the mediator, with the assistance of the other participants, to evaluate the
particular circumstances of the case to determine the relative risk of harm to
the children involved before proceeding to the facilitative stage.
C. Facilitative Stage
Once the circumstances of the particular case have been evaluated, the
mediator should move forward into a facilitative stage in which they assist
the parties in the resolution of their conflict. This can often be done in a four
step process: (1) assess, (2) educate, (3) problem-solve, and (4) negotiate.95
The mediator begins by assessing the circumstances of the conflict, then
91. See discussion supra note 91.
92. Courts have repeatedly done so without being able to consider the benefits and burdens of
stability.
[T]he First Amendment... precludes a preference for some religion over none,
regardless of the secular benefits presumed to be at stake .... The exclusion of the
benefits of stability in religious inculcation and of religiosity in general are apparently
part of the price that must be paid for religious freedom and constitutional recognition of
parental rights.
Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1151-52. Fortunately, this can be remedied in mediation.
93. See DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS, supra note 50. Additionally, this duty applies when the
agreement unfairly represents the interests of either party involved. Id.
94. See MEIERDING, supra note 61, § 3-10. This may require the use of caucus to gather
additional information from one spouse that they might otherwise be uncomfortable communicating
in the presence of the other spouse. Id.
95. Id.
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conveying to the parties the findings of the evaluative stage.96 The clergy
participating in the mediation will provide insight to the mediator by
advocating for each respective party and assisting in suggesting solutions.
Where the mediator is able to find common ground within the interests of
both parents, these consistencies should now be presented to the parties. It is
especially important for the mediator to remain impartial at this stage in the
process and refrain from allowing personal biases to navigate the facilitation
of negotiation.97 Here, the advocate for the child may also participate in the
process by conveying the child's interests in relation to those expressed by
the parents. Providing the parents with a complete picture of the
circumstances of the case, including the interests of the child, is paramount
to facilitating resolution of the conflict. This can be accomplished with
much greater success when there are multiple viewpoints and expertise
provided by the clergy as well as an advocate for the child.
Despite the child's interests being expressed to the parents through the
advocate, in some cases, what constitutes the best interests of the child might
not be entirely clear on the surface of the dispute. Since the effect of
religion on child development can be an extremely complicated subject, it
may be necessary to provide an additional parental education component to
the mediation process.98 By offering both parents access to current research
on religion and child development, as well as general information on
parenting post-divorce, the parents will be better able to brainstorm solutions
to the religious conflict that incorporate the interests of the child. The
participating clergy provide a valuable resource here, but may not provide
enough objective insight and knowledge regarding the psychological and
developmental consequences of the proposed arrangement.
Once the parents are educated as to the psychological implications of the
dispute and ultimate agreement on the child, the mediator should encourage
the parties, with the assistance of all participants, to brainstorm potential
96. The mediator must be careful not to disclose information gathered during confidential
communications, such as during caucus.
97. "It is often difficult to set one's own standards of fairness and equity aside." Meierding,
supra note 40, at 298. However this can be achieved by "... [H]elping the parties protect
themselves and their own interests by assisting them in understanding the consequences of their
agreement, while respecting the cultural values and norms that the parties bring to the table." Id.
98. See generally MEIERDING, supra note 61, § 3-25 to 3-26. Parents should be educated as to
the perceived effect of access to different religions and the effect of religion in general on child
development.
21
Lane: For Heaven's Sake, Give the Child a Voice: An ADR Approach to Int
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2010
solutions.99 The additional factors discussed in Zummo should be considered
in formulating an agreement that is consistent with the best interest of the
child, and giving equal weight to their right to religious freedom.
First, the importance of maintaining stability of the child's beliefs
should be considered based on a determination of their relative religious
identity.'00 Where a child's religious identity is strong, it may be in the
child's best interest to maintain the stability of those beliefs.'0 '
Second, the perceived probability of harm resulting from exposure to
"inconsistent" religions should be considered without making any automatic
assumptions of harm. Since harm is speculative, it should be discussed, but
parents should be educated as to both sides of the argument regarding the
effects on child development.10 2  This information can be incorporated into
99. This can be done either together in a mediation session, or separately between sessions in
preparation for negotiation.
100. "[T]he government is inherently and constitutionally incompetent to determine whether
stability or instability in religious beliefs would be in the best interest of a child." Zummo v.
Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1151 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). However, they discuss the inappropriateness of
the assumption that stability is preferred to instability:
Stability in a path to damnation could not be said to be more in a child's "best interests"
than an instability which offered the hope of movement toward a path to eternal
salvation. Similarly, if all religions or a particular religion were merely harmful and
repressive delusion, then stability in such a delusion could not be said to be more in a
child's "best interests" than instability which might pave the way to escape from the
delusion.
Id. at 1150. In the mediation setting, the child advocate, as well as the child's parents in some cases,
is better suited to evaluate the importance of stability under the particular circumstances of the case.
101. Where the child has been raised in accordance with one religion and clearly identifies with
that religion, there is a greater risk of harm in separating them from that religious identity than say a
child who is either too young to have formed an attachment to any particular religion, or whose
access to religion has not be paramount in the development of their personal identity. See, e.g.,
MacLagan v. Klein, 473 S.E.2d 778 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996). This case, brought before the Court of
Appeals of North Carolina, provides an example of a situation in which the child's sense of religious
identity was strong enough that instability in religious training constituted actual harm to the child's
well being. Id. at 787. As a result of the courts intervention in the parents' custody dispute, custody
was awarded to the mother, then to the father, and then to both parents jointly in subsequent
hearings. Id. at 781-84. The parents had an initial agreement to raise the child in the Jewish faith,
and the child had identified with the Jewish faith since she was three years old. Id. at 787.
However, during the litigation process, when the child was between four and five years old, the child
was exposed to Methodist services and teachings by her grandmother and mother. Id. at 782. The
appellate court affirmed the trial courts order of joint custody, restricting decisions regarding the
child's religious training and practice to her father on the grounds that she "experienced stress and
anxiety as a result of her exposure to two conflicting religions which have had a detrimental effect
on her emotional well-being." Id. at 787-88. While this case brings into question the court's
competence in determining at what age a child has a legally recognizable religious identity, it
illustrates the court's application of a child's religious identity to the importance of stability in
religious teachings, in ascertaining the child's best interests.
102. Commentators differ in opinion as to whether exposing a child to different religions, on its
face constitutes harm to the child. See Morris v. Morris, 412 A.2d 139, 142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979)
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the parent education component so that when this factor is discussed, the
parents will be able to have an informed discussion as to whether the
specific circumstances indicate a high probability of harm resulting from
inconsistency. While in some cases it is beneficial for children to have
access to multiple religious teachings and traditions in that they have a better
foundation for choosing their own religion, this is not always the case.
When children are exposed to conflicting religious ideas and told by one
parent that the religious teachings provided by the other parent are wrong,
this creates confusion and undoubtedly constitutes a threat to the integrity of
the child.1 °3 In these circumstances, the parents should be encouraged to put
their own interests aside, as much as possible, and focus on reaching a
compromise that serves the interests of the child. The parents' reluctance to
compromise on such an important issue as the religious training of their
children may undoubtedly create impasse in the negotiation. However, the
(stating, "Quite apart from any concern with the child's spiritual salvation ... it is beyond dispute
that a young child reared into two inconsistent religious traditions will quite probably experience
some deleterious physical or mental effects."). This statement is a broad generalization and evidence
of the judge's personal bias used to justify the opinion. See also Praagh, supra note 6 and
accompanying text. Overgeneralizations and bias such as this can be avoided in mediation through
the use of properly trained mediators. Mediator trainer, Nina Meierding, states, "[b]ecause societal
and cultural norms are in a constant state of flux, the mediator must be continually evaluating and
incorporating culturally bound issues into the negotiations. Mediators must leave not only their egos
at the door but also their own ethnocentric attitudes about fairness." Meierding, supra note 40, at 8;
but see Dwyer, supra note 33, at 1434 (stating
It seems unlikely that any individual, upon reaching adulthood, would resent having had
a range of options in matters of belief, lifestyle, and health preserved for her during her
childhood. It seems reasonable to believe that she might want to make her own choices
as an adult in accordance with the personal attitudes and ambitions she has developed,
rather than having almost all options closed off to her just because he parents wished to
determine her life for her.).
See also Donald L. Beschle, God Bless the Child?: The Use of Religion as a Factor in Child Custody
and Option Proceedings, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 383, at 407-12 (discussing studies conducted on the
relationship between religion and emotional well-being and concluding that "there is consistent
evidence that religion is a source of mental and emotional well being," but the important factor is
stability). Therefore, if taken out of the context of religion, the teachings of both faiths can be
reconciled without creating instability and inconsistency in parenting, the risks to the child's welfare
can be minimized or eliminated entirely.
103. Courts have been confronted with similar situations, but are unable to restrict custody or
visitation rights on religious grounds, "except where there is a clear and affirmative showing that the
conflicting religious beliefs affect the general welfare of the child." Munoz v. Munoz, 489 P.2d
1133, 1135 (Wash. 1971). In mediation, however, it is possible for the parents to negotiate an
agreement on their own terms thereby increasing individual satisfaction with the result.
Additionally, if they are educated as to the psychological effects of conveying conflicting messages
to the child, they will be less likely to do so.
645
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mediator should expect this and employ techniques to overcome this
impasse, such as reminding the parties of risks they may face by failing to
reach an agreement and resorting to court intervention.
104
Where the risk of harm from exposing the child to different religions is
low, it may be possible to allow both parents to maintain their right to pass
on their religious beliefs and traditions to the child without providing
directly contradictory messages. In considering the interests of all parties
involved, it may be helpful to take the issue out of the rigid context of
religion and focus more specifically on the desired aims of a particular
religious or non-religious upbringing. Presumably each parent, at least in
cases of interfaith marriages, respects the right of the other to practice a
different religion or hold different beliefs. 10 5 While in a divorce context this
respect may have been lost, the fact that it once existed naturally flows to an
understanding that the child should be afforded that same respect to choose
his or her own religious path. 10 6 If the parents are able to understand this
concept, they will be more likely to agree that access to multiple religions
could be beneficial in affording the child the freedom to choose their
religion, rather than having it forced upon them in accord with their parent's
constitutional rights.'0 7 By interpreting the best interest of the child in terms
of what custody arrangement will provide the child with the best possible
foundation for exercising his or her own religious freedom, the specific
labels of religion should be removed in favor of establishing an agreement
104. CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS 313-14 (2003). While these
techniques are often effective in overcoming impasse, the possibility of reaching fatal impasse is still
very real. When the mediation process is not feasible or ineffective in facilitating an agreement
between parents, the next step should not automatically be litigation. With the uncertainty of court-
adjudicated custody arrangements looming on the horizon, parents may benefit from pursuing some
form of arbitration prior to resorting to the courts. The use of non-binding arbitration may be
successful in facilitating a religious training arrangement in particularly complex or high-conflict
disputes, and this should be considered as a next resort. With non-binding arbitration, parents are
able to get an idea of what the outcome might be if the case is put before a judge, without the risk of
the decision's binding effect. Therefore, it is more likely that they will be inclined to reach a
settlement or return to mediation to negotiate an acceptable custody arrangement without resorting to
litigation. Since the arbitrator is an impartial judge, unlike the mediator, the results of this dispute
resolution process should more closely resemble the possible outcome of litigation at only a fraction
of the cost, both in finances and time.
105. In situations where one spouse converted prior to the marriage or after separation, the
parents may be less understanding of the right of the child or other parent to hold different religious
beliefs. In this case, the mediator may be required to reiterate the right of the child to freedom of
religion and suggest ways in which the parents' respective religious beliefs can co-exist.
106. See Dwyer, supra note 33.
107. See id.
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that provides this foundation based on specific aims of the respective
parent's religious interests.
0 8
D. Drafting an Agreement
The ability of parents to reach an agreement in mediation, rather than
resorting to court intervention, signifies their capacity to compromise in their
competing parental authority. The reduction of inter-parental conflict goes a
long way towards improving the child's ability to adjust productively to the
dissolution of their parents' marriage.' °9 The agreement must be in writing
and address the agreed upon solutions to all faith related issues, including,
but not limited to, the following: (1) the specific religion or interfaith
compromise in which the child will be raised; (2) how and with whom the
child will spend religious holidays; (3) who will provide religious
instruction; (4) who will pay for outside instruction if necessary; and (5)
what religious and cultural practices will be followed by the child in the
homes of each respective parent." 0
Upon reaching a custody arrangement, it is necessary for the parents to
avoid communicating destructive or conflicting ideologies to the child. A
positive coexistence of different religions greatly reduces the risk of harm to
the child's welfare and reduces the need to return to mediation or litigation
in the future to alter custody arrangements.
IV. CONCLUSION
Due to the constitutional barriers faced by courts when dealing with
interfaith custody disputes, and the shortcomings of the "best interest" of the
child standard for adequately protecting the children's rights, there is a clear
need for alternative means of resolving these disputes. By evaluating the
specific circumstances of the case and focusing on the rights of children,
application of several factors, borrowed from the court in Zummo, provides
108. While the focus often turns to the difference between religions and a concern about
inconsistent teachings, there also exist significant commonalities between different religions. For
further discussion see supra Part III.B and note 90.
109. "Research is... consistent in showing that continuing interparental conflict is one of the
most important predictors of variability in children's post divorce adjustment. As early as the first
year after divorce ... children fare better when conflict is reduced than when conflict remains high."
See INTERPARENTAL CONFLICT AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT, supra note 84.
110. Marx, supra note 78.
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mediators and divorcing couples alike, with a dispute resolution approach
better suited to address the unique challenges of interfaith custody disputes.
A clergy and child-inclusive model of mediation additionally serves to meet
the needs of all parties involved and creates a successful and durable
interfaith custody arrangement.
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